Nyarko, Y. (2010). Most Games Violate the Common Priors Doctrine. *International Journal of Economic Theory*, *6*(1), 189-194.

The type of a player in a game describes the beliefs of that player about the types of others.

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Nyarko, Y., & Schotter, A. (2002). An Experimental Study of Belief Learning using Elicited Beliefs. *Econometrica*, *70*(3), 971-1005. (See data for this paper). ** **

This paper investigates belief learning.

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Nyarko, Y., & Schotter, A. (2000). Comparing Learning Models with Ideal Micro & Experimental Data Sets. New York University.

This paper compares three learning models. The models compared are the Reinforcement Learning Model of Erev and Roth, the EWA model of Camerer and Ho and a Belief Learning model in which beliefs are elicited from subjects using a proper scoring rule…

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Nyarko, Y. (1998). The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games, Working Paper (No. 98-12). C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.

Games with incomplete information or randomness in the moves of others typically have many decision-theoretically equivalent formulations of the type space…

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Nyarko, Y. (1998). Learning, Quantal Response Equilibrium and Equilibrium in Beliefs, Working Paper (No. 01-03, revised 2001). C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.

This paper makes two points. First, the modeling used in the rational (Bayesian) learning literature can be generalized to handle the repeated shocks to preferences inherent and implicit in models of quantal response equilibria (QRE).

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Nyarko, Y. (1998). Bayesian Learning and Convergence to Nash Equilibria without Common Priors. *Economic Theory*, *11*(3), 643-655.

Consider an infinitely repeated game where each player is characterized by a ‘type’ which may be unknown to the other plays in the game. Suppose further that each player’s belief about others is independent of that player’s type…

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Nyarko, Y. (1997). Convergence in Economic Models with Bayesian Hierarchies of Beliefs. *Journal of Economic Theory*, *74*(2), 266-296.

I study a model where hierarchies of beliefs (the beliefs about the beliefs of other agents, etc.) are important. I provide conditions under which optimal actions of agents will converge to the Nash equilibrium of the model characterized by the true, previously unknown ``fundamentals.''

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Kiefer, N., & Nyarko, Y. “Savage-Bayesian Models of Economics.” *Essays in learning and rationality in economics and games*, Basil Blackwell, 40-62, 1995.

The “state of the art” in learning models in economics is highly unsettled. On the one hand, we have the optimizing models in which learning occurs as a byproduct…

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Nyarko, Y., Woodford, M., & Yannelis, N. C. (1994). Bounded Rationality and Learning. *Economic Theory*, *4*(6), 811-820.

Many have objected to the use of the Nash equilibrium (or more generally, Bayesian Nash equilibrium) concept in game theory, and similarly to the use of the rational expectations concept in the theory of competitive markets…

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Nyarko, Y. (1993). Review of the book “Games, Strategies and Managers,” by John McMillan, *Journal of Economic Literature,* *31*(2), 890-891.

Can the logic of game theory be presented as effectively in words as by mathematical models?

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Nyarko, Y. (1994). Bayesian Learning Leads to Correlated Equilibria in Normal Form Games. *Economic Theory*, *4*(6), 821-841.

Consider an infinitely repeated normal form game where each player is characterized by a “type” which may be unknown to the other players of the game…

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